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11 Introduction
For all the abundance of competing models in economic research, the agents who pop-
ulate them are, as a rule, fully devoted to the one model in which they are cast. They
know everything about their model (including parameter values) and want to know noth-
ing about any other. All their uncertainty is concentrated on the stochastic elements of
the model, which, under the assumption of rational expectations (RE), coincides with
the data generating process (DGP). Several approaches to relaxing these assumptions
have been explored. Here we focus on one such approach, which we refer to as “Hansen-
Sargent robustness”. In recent contributions, Lars Hansen, Thomas Sargent, and coau-
thors have proposed an appealing method of designing choices under model uncertainty.1
This method, which is based on robust control techniques adapted from engineering, en-
compasses RE as a special case, and has the advantage that the robust solution of a given
program can be derived from a suitably modiﬁed standard RE program.
This paper is concerned with solving the Hansen-Sargent robust version of the familiar
RE program in which a planner minimizes an intertemporal loss function subject to the
law of motion of the economy. If the law of motion is completely backward looking, the
planner’s commitment technology is irrelevant. Hansen and Sargent (2002) provide a
complete treatment of the robust version of this case.
In the macroeconomic literature, however, the law of motion is often a model involving
expectations. It then becomes necessary to specify the commitment technology of the
planner. In the RE case, there are three standard possibilities: the planner commits to
the optimal policy (commitment), or to a simple linear rule (simple rule), or she cannot
commit at all (discretion). Hansen and Sargent (ch. 15) give a solution approach for the
robust version of the commitment case. This paper’s main contribution is to suggest and
implement solutions for the robust versions of discretion and simple rules.
The paper does not assume that the reader is familiar with the literature on robust
control. Section 2 provides an introduction. It attempts to convey the essence of Hansen
and Sargent’s approach, deals with backward looking models, and then moves on to show
how to solve forward looking models in the commitment case. The simple New Keynesian
model of Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999) is solved as an example. This section also
1The bulk of Hansen and Sargent’s work on robustness is contained in a book-length manuscript
(Hansen and Sargent (2002)), which presents results from most of their articles (and more) in a compre-
hensive treatment. Chapters 1 and 2 give an introduction and a summary of the main results. Hansen
and Sargent (2000b, 2001) are relatively non-technical papers which oﬀer a good introduction. Unless
otherwise stated, the reference is to the manuscript (Hansen and Sargent (2002)).
2establishes the notation and the key concepts used in free and user friendly software
(Matlab, Octave, and Gauss versions) which can perform all the calculations described in
this paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections 3 and 4 propose an extension for
the discretionary case and for simple rules respectively. We argue that these suggestions
are consistent with Hansen and Sargent’s rationale for robustness. They also preserve the
property that the robust program can be transformed into a standard RE program. Sev-
eral examples and applications illustrate the discretionary and simple rule cases. Within
the context of the New Keynesian model of Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999), we ﬁnd the
following: robustness makes monetary policy more aggressive also in the discretionary
solution (conﬁrming a result often found for the commitment solution); robustness is a
promising way of interpreting deviations from the expectations hypothesis of the term
structure; robustness increases the inﬂation bias in the discretionary equilibrium; robust-
ness in private agent’s expectations increases inﬂation and output volatility (even if policy
is non-robust). Section 5 concludes.
2 Robust Control with Commitment
2.1 Commitment in Backward Looking Models
Like a RE agent, a Hansen-Sargent robust planner aims at minimizing a loss function
and entertains a reference model (the approximating model) which represents the law of
motion of the economy. Like a RE agent, she can formulate model consistent statements
on the probability of any outcome given a model. However, unlike a RE agent, she is not
certain that the approximating model coincides with the true model. For example, exact
parameter values will not be available in most circumstances.
Being uncertain about the model, the planner considers a set of them when designing
an optimal policy. Faced with the same situation, a Bayesian planner would combine
the data with her priors over the probability of each model being correct to arrive at
a probability distribution over all models. To formulate a policy function, each model
would then be weighted according to its probability and to its associated expected loss.
A Bayesian agent therefore reduces all uncertainty to calculated risk. A robust agent,
on the other hand, does not have her uncertainty as well organized. She is assumed to
face Knightian uncertainty over a set of models, where Knightian uncertainty denotes the
inability to express one’s beliefs fully in terms of well deﬁned probabilistic statements.
3This is not equivalent to saying that all models are considered equally likely (in which
case a Bayesian solution would be straightforward). Rather, a robust agent does not
have suﬃcient conﬁdence in her beliefs to formulate consistent statements such as “The
probability that model A is true is π” for any conceivable model.
An agent faced with multiple models needs to adopt a choice criterion, as each model
will generally recommend a diﬀerent course of action. For a robust agent, this criterion
cannot involve a probabilistic weighting of models. Hansen and Sargent (following Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989)) adopt a min-max approach: for a proposed policy rule, the planner
ﬁnds the worst model in the set (the maximum expected loss), eventually selecting the rule
that minimizes the maximum expected loss. Loosely speaking, the aim of robust control
is to design a policy that will work reasonably well even if the approximating model
does not coincide with the true model, as opposed to a policy that is optimal if they do
coincide but possibly disastrous if they don’t. A classical application in engineering is to
program a rocket so that it will get very close to the target even if the law of motion is
not correctly speciﬁed, rather than be on the target if the law of motion is exactly right
but go completely astray otherwise.
Robust control in engineering is in a sense normative, because it represents engineers’
best eﬀort to optimize in the face of unknown misspeciﬁcations. An analogous motivation
can arguably be used in economics: the complexity of real economies is so overwhelming
that it is not conceivable to even formulate an exhaustive list of all possible models, much
less to assign a prior probability to each. But in economic applications it is also possible
to use robust control descriptively, as a tool to maintain analytical tractability and mimic
certain empirical violation of expected utility theorems. In particular, robust control can
rationalize agents’ aversion to situations in which the odds are not obvious.2 In a market
setting, this ambiguity aversion tends to translate into a higher (with respect to RE
agents with the same preferences) price of risk, a feature exploited by Hansen, Sargent,
and Tallarini (1999) to show that a preference for robustness decreases the equity premium
puzzle in a standard model.
Consider this example: a risk neutral ﬁrm is planning an investment which yields a
discounted proﬁt pA in state of the world A, and a loss of pB otherwise. The decision on
whether to invest or not is obvious if the ﬁrm can conﬁdently attach a unique probability
π to the state A. However, the solution is no longer straightforward if the ﬁrm considers
a range of π, say π ∈ [πL,πH], to be plausible. If the ﬁrm is a robust decision maker, its
2See Hansen and Sargent (2002) ch. 1 for an example.
4adoption of a min-max criterion means that it will act as if the relevant probability was πL.
Some readers may infer from the example that a robust agent is observationally equivalent
to a Bayesian agent with a higher degree of risk aversion and a ﬂat prior. While it may
be possible to establish this equivalence in speciﬁc circumstances, the required degree of
risk aversion would not be constant, but rather vary with the level of uncertainty. For
example, an agent who appears to be risk neutral in bets involving a fair coin will seem
risk averse if there are doubts on the fairness of the coin.
From a technical point of view, robustness involves a switch from a minimization
problem (minimizing a loss function) to an appropriately speciﬁed min-max problem. In
order to set up and solve a min-max problem, it is convenient to work with a two-agent
representation: the policy function selected by the planner is the equilibrium outcome of
a two person game in which a ﬁctitious evil agent, whose only goal is to maximize the
planner’s loss, chooses a model from the available set, and the planner chooses a policy
function.
The loss function is assumed to be quadratic, and the model linear.3 Because the evil
agent is just a metaphor for the planner’s cautionary behavior, he shares the planner’s
approximating model and loss function (which of course he wants to maximize rather than
minimize). This describes a zero sum game, and we can conveniently write a single loss
function. Hansen and Sargent show that the program for the backward looking model























t+1vt+1 ≤ η0, (3)
and where x0 is given. In this problem, xt is the state vector (n × 1), ut is the planner’s
control vector (k × 1), t+1 is the vector (n × 1) of zero mean iid shocks with an identity
covariance matrix, and vt+1 is the evil agent’s control vector (n × 1). The Q and R
matrices are assumed to be symmetric.
The standard RE dynamic control problem corresponds to η0 = 0. In this case, the
maximization part of the problem becomes irrelevant, and the planner simply minimizes
the loss function (1), using the control vector ut, subject to the law of motion (2) with
vt+1 = 0. In the general case, the evil agent is given an intertemporal budget η0 which
3Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2000) and Hansen and Sargent (2002) ch. 16 discuss extensions to
a more general non-linear framework.
5deﬁnes the set of models (misspeciﬁcations) that the planner is entertaining. Therefore
the set of models that the planner is considering can be interpreted as a ball around the
approximating model, where η0 is the radius of the ball. Section 2.3 considers the choice
of η0; for now we take it as given.
Notice that the stochastic shocks are important for model uncertainty. As can be
seen from (2), the evil agent’s control vector vt+1 is premultiplied by the matrix C. This
captures the fact that there can only be model uncertainty if the true parameters of the
law of motion are (at least partially) masked by random noise (C 6= 0).



















subject to xt+1 = Axt + But + C(t+1 + vt+1), (5)
and where x0 is given. Since the value function is monotonous and concave in η0, there is
a bijective negative function from η0 to the Lagrange multiplier θ, so θ deﬁnes the set of
models available to the evil agent, with 0 < θ < ∞. A very low θ allows the evil agent to
wreck havoc, while θ = ∞ corresponds to RE.
Misspeciﬁcations distort the approximating model by modifying the errors. However,
respect of the budget (3) is the only formal constraint imposed on the evil agent, and the
formulation (4) enforces this constraint. This means that his choice of policy functions for
vt+1 includes a wide range of misspeciﬁed dynamics, including wrong parameters (vt+1 is
a linear function of xt), autocorrelated errors (vt+1 is a linear function of lags of x1t), and
nonlinearities (vt+1 is a nonlinear function of xt). At the same time, the researcher needs
to specify only one additional parameter (θ) to robustify the program. This parsimony
is an advantage in some cases, as it limits the number of additional parameters and the
amount of prior knowledge about possible misspeciﬁcations, but it can become a drawback
if the researcher wants to focus on a speciﬁc misspeciﬁcation, such as distortions in a given
parameter.
Other approaches to robustness, which we may call parametric (for instance, Giannoni
(2002) and the Bayesian approach pioneered by Brainard (1967)) allow (but also require)
the researcher to be more speciﬁc about the exact nature of the uncertainty. In a Bayesian
approach, the planner uses her prior probability distribution over models (which a Hansen
and Sargent robust planner does not have by assumption), so the researcher needs to
specify a prior over all possible models, which can quickly become problematic. Moreover,
the solution can be quite complex. Giannoni (2002) is closer to Hansen and Sargent in
6that the planner is solving for the min-max. However, the researcher must specify the set
of possible models by setting an interval for each of the model’s parameters. Onatski and
Williams (2003) build a more general structure which allows the researcher to be quite
speciﬁc about the type of misspeciﬁcations feared by the planner (wrong parameters,
measurement errors and autocorrelated errors).
The loss function and the law of motion for the backward looking model given by























subject to xt+1 = Axt + B
∗u
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and where x0 is given. At ﬁrst the min-max form of the problem may seem intrinsically
diﬀerent from a standard minimization. However, because ﬁrst order conditions for a
minimum are the same as for a maximum, the problem can be treated as a standard RE
one, to which standard solution algorithms can be applied (for example, see S¨ oderlind
(1999) or Hansen and Sargent (2002), ch. 3 and 15).4,5
The solution of the program is that ut and vt+1 are linear functions of the state xt
u
∗











Notice that in spite of all his freedom, with a backward looking linear model the evil agent
keeps things simple, and optimally chooses to set vt+1 as a linear function of the state
vector xt. From a technical point of view, the linearity of the evil agent’s policy function
should come as no surprise: the robust program has been rewritten in standard RE form,
and therefore the policy function for u∗
t must be linear, since the RE policy function for
ut is known to be linear.
Hansen and Sargent emphasize that the robust solution is not certainty equivalent:
4Second order conditions ensure that the evil agent is maximizing rather than minimizing. These are
unlikely to be problematic. Hansen and Sargent (2002) prove that there is a θ0 such that, for any θ > θ0,
the expected value of the loss function is ﬁnite and the second order conditions are satisﬁed. An easy way
to check that the second order conditions are satisﬁed is to make sure that the expected loss is higher
than in the RE solution (the value of the expected loss function is included in our software). However, if
θ is chosen with the detection error probability approach (see Section 2.3), experience indicates that the
second order conditions are typically satisﬁed for any reasonable value of θ.
5Our software follows S¨ oderlind (1999) in using the Schur decomposition, resulting in a reliable and
fast algorithm.
7both Fu and Fv are functions of C. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the evil
agent hits harder where he can do the most damage with a given budget, which, ceteris
paribus, is where the variance of the forecast error is larger. Alternatively, the planner
fears misspeciﬁcation the most where errors with large variance better mask the true
parameters. Technically, the program (6)–(7) is still linear-quadratic: the reason why
certainty equivalence does not hold is that C appears in B∗ (see equation (8)).
The equilibrium dynamics of the model is found by combining the policy function with
the law of motion (7). Clearly, this dynamics depends on what the true model actually
is—which is captured here by the evil agent’s controls, vt+1. Most researchers have focused
on two cases.
First, the worst case model deﬁnes the behavior of the economy when the planner’s
pessimism turns out to be fully warranted. Formally, this means using the policy functions
(9) in the law of motion (7) to get
xt+1 = (A − BFu − CFv)xt + Ct+1. (10)
This dynamics is typically also used to represent the beliefs of the agents in the model—for
instance, to price assets as discounted sums of expected future payoﬀs.
Second, the approximating model is the reference model which sets Fv = 0 in (10).
Note that the policy is still robust, so Fu is the same as in the worst case model. Comparing
the dynamics of these two models conveys information on the misspeciﬁcation that the
planner is fearing.
2.2 Commitment in Forward Looking Models
Forward looking models introduce another player, the private sector, who forms expec-
tations. We consider a class of forward looking models that can be represented by the
















where x1t is a n1×1 vector of predetermined (backward looking) variables with x10 given,
and x2t is a n2×1 vector of forward looking (or jump) variables. Only the predetermined
variables have shocks, so t+1 is an iid n1 × 1 vector with zero mean and an identity
covariance matrix—and the last n2 rows of the C matrix are ﬁlled with zeros. The evil
agent’s control vector always “hides” behind the shocks, so vt+1 is also an n1 × 1 vector.
8The planner’s loss function (1) is unchanged and the evil agent’s budget constraint is







Having introduced robustness in a forward looking model, we need to decide whether
private sector expectations are standard or robust. If they are robust, we must specify the
private sector’s approximating model, degree of robustness and loss function. Giannoni
(2002) and Onatski (2000), who also study uncertainty in forward looking models under
commitment, assume that the private sector has no uncertainty, but knows that the
approximating model is exactly correct, and also knows the planner’s loss function and
degree of robustness. On a critical stance, Sims (2001) argues that min-max decisions are
a more appropriate modeling device for the private sector than for a central bank.6 We
follow Hansen and Sargent in taking the middle ground, and assume that the private sector
and planner share the same loss function, approximating model and degree of robustness.
These assumptions greatly simplify the solution.
In the case at hand, the planner credibly commits. Unlike the backward looking case,
it matters whether or not the evil agent also commits. Hansen and Sargent assume that
he does. This is intuitively appealing, considering the rationale for the existence of an
evil agent: when designing a policy rule, the planner is uncertain about the model and
thus designs a robust rule as if she was facing an evil agent. The evil agent is just a
metaphor used to solve the min-max problem eﬃciently. This perspective suggests that
the evil agent should optimize when and only when the planner does.
Technically, the program can be rewritten in state space form as a standard RE prob-


























































and where x10 is given. The numerical solution algorithm we adopt is detailed in S¨ oderlind
(1999), and is based on the generalized Schur decomposition.
The equilibrium dynamics is more complicated than in the backward looking model:
6Sims underlines the importance of the distinction between normative and descriptive when discussing
deviations from the RE paradigm. Speciﬁcally, he argues that while it is possible that private agents’
behavior may well be described as robust, it is not clear that a central bank should be advised to choose
a robust policy, rather than try to specify priors and carry out an optimal Bayesian procedure.
9the policy functions are history dependent and the forward looking variables (x2t) depend
on the equilibrium expectations of future values of the other model variables.
In any case, the worst case model is (as before) the equilibrium dynamics of (12)–(14),
that is, when the planner’s pessimism turns out to be fully warranted (the evil agent is
fully active). The approximating model uses the same policy function and expectations
formation—but sets the evil agent’s controls (vt+1) to zero (Appendix B gives the details
of these calculations). For example, in a monetary policy model with forward looking
price setting (a Calvo style Phillips curve, say), the approximating model uses the same
central bank interest rule and mapping from the state of the economy to the price setting
as the worst case model. This means, eﬀectively, that the approximating model uses both
robust policy and robust expectations. We will return to the role expectations formation
when we discuss simple policy rules in Section 4.2.
Example: A Simple New Keynesian Model
We provide an example of how to frame a forward looking model in state space form. The
model consists of an Euler/IS equation and of a Calvo style Phillips curve, as in Clarida,
Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999)
yt = Et yt+1 − γ(it − Et πt+1) + e1t, (15)
πt = β Et πt+1 + αyt + e2t, (16)
e1t = ρ1e1t−1 + ξ1t, where ξ1t is iid N(0,σ
2
1), and (17)
e2t = ρ2e2t−1 + ξ2t, where ξ2t is iid N(0,σ
2
2). (18)
In this model, it is the short interest rate controlled by the central bank, yt is the output
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10where we have ordered the predetermined variables (e1t and e2t) before the forward looking
variables (yt and πt). Then, premultiply by the inverse of the matrix on the far left we











, R = λi, and U = 04×1.
Once the model is written in standard form, solving for the robust policy only requires
specifying the degree of robustness (the scalar θ) and the solution strategy, which in this
case is commitment.
Figure 1 provides an introduction to the eﬀects of robustness in this model. The
parameters are set as follows: β = 0.99, γ = 0.5, α = 0.645, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.8, σ2
1 = σ2
2 = 1,
λy = 0.5, and λi = 0.2. We compute both the RE solution and the robust solution. The
latter of course depends on our choice of θ. For the moment we ask our readers to think of
the amount of robustness in this example as neither trivial nor unreasonably high.7 Figure
1.a plots the response of the cost-push process 2t to a one-standard-deviation innovation
(ζ2t = 1), for the approximating model and for the worst case model. It is evident that
robust agents fear that the cost-push process 2t will turn out to be more persistent than
implied by the approximating model. In the case at hand, the predetermined variables
are independent of the endogenous variables at all lags; that is, expectations cannot aﬀect
any predetermined variable, implying that the trajectory of 2t under the approximating
model is the same as under RE.
Figure 1.b shows the response of output (a forward-looking variable) to the same cost-
push shock. The contemporaneous response is the same for the approximating model
and for the worst case model8, but the dynamic paths are then diﬀerent, with output
feared to be more persistent than suggested by the approximating model. The RE and
the approximating solution share the same underlying dynamics for the predetermined
variables, but diﬀer because of the role of expectations.
2.3 Choosing the Degree of Robustness, θ
In formulating a robust control problem, the choice of θ is crucial, since the evil agent’s
constraint is always binding in a linear-quadratic framework. In other words, the policy
7Formally, θ corresponds to a detection error probability of 20% in a sample of 150 observations. (See
Section 2.3 for a discussion.)
8This is a general feature of the Hansen and Sargent solution, and is due to the fact that vt+1 is a
function of variables dated t or earlier.
11Figure 1: Impulse response functions of the cost-push process 2t and of output to a cost-
push innovation in the model of Clarida et al. (1999), commitment solution: standard RE
solution (continuous line), approximating solution (dashed line) and worst case solution
(thin dots).
function chosen by a robust planner (who prepares for the worst) is tailored on a model
lying on the boundary of the set from which the evil agent can choose.
This set is deﬁned by deviations from the approximating model, where the allowed
deviations are decreasing functions of the parameter θ (and hence increasing functions of
η0). The choice of the parameter θ is therefore crucial, as the planner’s policy function will
vary with it. Svensson (2002) uses this feature of the solution to stress what seems like a
weakness of robust control, at least from a Bayesian perspective: a model on the boundary
of the available set shapes the policy function, yet models outside this set (including those
only an epsilon away) receive no consideration. He also warns that “highly unlikely models
can come to dominate the outcome of robust control” (page 7). In a linear-quadratic
framework it is easy to make a robust planner look like a foolish catastrophist: her policy
function will be implausible if the amount of requested robustness is suﬃciently large (θ
is suﬃciently small).
While these warnings are appropriate, it is usually possible to deﬁne θ so that the
planner looks cautious rather than foolish. As a guide to choosing θ, Hansen and Sargent
adopt a detection error probability approach based on the idea that the models in the set
should not be easy to distinguish with the available data. Essentially, one takes an agnostic
position on whether the true data generating process is given by the approximating model
12or by the worst case model, and chooses a probability of making the wrong choice between
the two models on the basis of in-sample ﬁt, for a sample of given size.
The value of θ corresponding to this probability is computed by simulation, inverting
the monotonous function π(θ)
π(θ) = Probability(LA > LW|W)/2 + Probability(LW > LA|A)/2, (20)
where LA and LW are the values of the likelihood of the approximating and worst case
model respectively, and the notation (·|W) and (·|A) denotes that the DGP are the worst
case model and the approximating model respectively.9 Zero robustness corresponds to
a detection error probability of 50%. Hansen and Sargent suggest the range 10% to
20%. The larger the sample (for a given probability), the higher θ, so the uncertainty
surrounding the approximating model disappears as the sample goes to inﬁnity. However,
it is assumed that the planner makes no attempt to incorporate learning in a dynamic
fashion: when solving for a policy function at t, she does not consider the reduction in
uncertainty that future observations may provide (see Hansen and Sargent (2000b) for a
discussion).
Example: Persistence of Cost-Push Shocks
As an example of the eﬀects of varying θ, consider the simple New Keynesian model of
Section 2.2 (with the same parametrization), where it was noticed that the cost-push
shock 2t is more persistent in the worst case scenario. Figure 2 plots the response of 2t
to a one-standard-deviation innovation for varying degrees of robustness (i.e. for varying
detection error probabilities). As the detection error probability becomes smaller, 2t
becomes more persistent. The result is intuitive, since a more persistent process results
in larger inﬂation and output variance, and thus higher expected loss for the planner.
3 Robust Control with Discretion
The discretionary solution coincides with the commitment solution in a backward looking
model, which has already been treated in Section 2.1.
9See Hansen and Sargent (2002) ch. 8. The procedure requires a distributional assumption on t
(normality in our software). For applied research, it is advisable to verify that the results of interest are
not overly sensitive to reasonable variations in detection error probabilities.
13Figure 2: Impulse response functions of the cost-push process 2t to a cost-push innovation
in the model of Clarida et al. (1999), commitment solution, for diﬀerent detection error
probabilities.
3.1 Discretion in Forward Looking Models
When working with forward looking models (particularly in the ﬁeld of monetary policy)
it is often assumed that the planner (the central bank) cannot commit. Since this case is
of crucial interest, it seems important to extend the robust methods.10 In this section we
propose solution concepts and algorithms for dynamic models which preserve the property
of transforming the problem to a RE form.
In order to illustrate our solution approach to the robust case, it is useful to review
the main steps involved in the RE solution (see Backus and Driﬃl (1986) or the summary
in S¨ oderlind (1999) for a more detailed description of the solution procedure).
1. At time t, the private sector observes x1t and decides on a matrix Kt+1 to use in
formulating expectations E
a
t x2t+1 = Kt+1 E
a
t x1t+1, where the notation E
a
t denotes
agents’ expectations in period t. The planner moves after the private sector, so the
matrix Kt+1 incorporates a guess of the planner’s policy function.
2. At time t, the planner observes x1t and Kt+1 and chooses a policy function ut =
−Futx1t+1 to minimize the loss function (1) subject to the law of motion (11) (the
10Hansen and Sargent (2002) ch. 5 discuss the robust discretionary solution of the static model in
Kydland and Prescott (1977).
14same as in the commitment case), but also subject to the expectation formation
process E
a
t x2t+1 = Kt+1 E
a
t x1t+1.
3. The equilibrium solution is found when the matrix Kt+1 of the private sector’s expec-
tations coincides with the mathematical expectation. This happens when the policy
function Fut implied by Kt+1 is also the policy function that solves the planner’s
problem given Kt+1. In equilibrium Kt+1 and Fut are constant.
Our proposal for dealing with the discretionary case is to extend the principle that,
robustness being a metaphor for the planner’s concerns for model misspeciﬁcation at
the time of choosing a policy function, the evil agent should optimize when and only
when the planner does. When applied to the commitment case, this results in Hansen
and Sargent’s solution. In the discretionary case, this principle suggests that since the
planner reoptimizes at every period (taking expectations as given), the evil agent should
be allowed to do the same. The interpretation is that every time the planner considers a
policy, she will have to deal with uncertainty and design a robust rule.
We maintain the assumptions (used by Hansen and Sargent in the commitment case)
that the private sector’s loss function, approximating model, and θ are the same as the
planner’s.
The main steps involved in the RE solution are therefore modiﬁed as follows to ﬁnd the
robust discretionary policy. First, Kt+1 now implies a guess of the policy functions of both
the planner and the evil agent (private agents share the planner’s concern for robustness).
Second, the evil agent chooses a policy function vt+1 = −Fvtx1t (at the same time as the
planner) in order to maximize the loss function, subject to the same constraints as the
planner, but also subject to the budget Et Σ∞
s=1βsvt+svt+s ≤ η. Third, in equilibrium both
policy rules are constant and consistent with the private sector’s expectations.
This formulation of the robust discretionary case seems quite natural. Moreover,
since η does not depend on t, the size of the deviations from the approximating model
contemplated by the planner is constant through time.
This formulation is also convenient, since it allows us to handle the discretionary
case by augmenting the law of motion and the loss function just like in the commitment
case. In practice, this means ﬁnding the discretionary solution to the problem detailed in
equations (12)–(14). We use algorithms developed for the standard RE discretionary case
(ours follows S¨ oderlind (1999)), because they solve for the ﬁrst order conditions (which
are the same for the minimum and maximum).
15In equilibrium, the predetermined variables (x1t) follow a VAR(1) process
x1t+1 = Mx1t + C1t+1, (21)















The only diﬀerence between the worst case model and the approximating model is in
terms of the M matrix in (21) (see Appendix B for details). The diﬀerence between the
two M matrices is therefore a useful indicator of the misspeciﬁcation that the planner
fears.
Since (22) is the same, it is clear that the approximating model uses both robust policy
and robust expectations (the mapping from the predetermined variables to the forward
looking variables is very closely tied to expectations).
Application: The Simple New Keynesian Model
The model deﬁned by equations (15)–(19) is written in state space form exactly as for the
commitment solution. Only the solution algorithm changes. The robust policy function
takes the form given in equation (22) and is therefore not history dependent.
Consider the following application. We wish to derive the central bank policy function
and the behavior of the economy as the degree of robustness goes from zero (RE) to a θ
which implies a 20% probability of error detection in a sample of 150 observations. The
other parameters are set as in Section 2.2. Figure 3 shows the results. Each quadrant
plots the response of a variable to a cost push shock (ξ2t) for three cases: standard RE
(θ = ∞), the approximating model, and the worst case model.
Robustness leads to higher reactions of all variables at all horizons. The response of
the short interest rate is also higher for the approximating model (when policy is robust
but vt+1 is always zero) than for the standard RE case. Finally, the robust monetary
policy function is more aggressive: the policy vector Fu is −(3.0,1.9)0 for the RE solution,
and −(3.5,2.4)0 for the robust solution. This result is not new, as other papers conclude
that robustness lead to more aggressive policies under commitment.11 However, it is of
11See, for instance, Hansen and Sargent (2001), and, with a diﬀerent approach, Giannoni (2002).
However, this result is not general (Hansen and Sargent (2002), ch.8, provide a counter-example): the
outcome will depend on the model and on the loss function parameters.
16Figure 3: Impulse response functions of inﬂation, output and short interest rate to a cost-
push shock in the model of Clarida et al. (1999), discretionary solution: standard RE
solution (continuous line), approximating solution (dashed line) and worst case solution
(thin dots).
some independent interest that we reach the same conclusion in the discretionary case.
A recurrent feature of the solution is the evil agent’s common choice of increasing the
persistence of the driving processes. In Figure 3 the responses of all variables are in fact
more persistent in the worst case than in both the standard RE and the approximating
case. More persistent processes imply higher variances and therefore a greater loss for
the risk averse planner.12 Fearing this outcome, a robust agent typically has a stronger
reaction to shocks than a standard agent.13
This feature of the robust solution, namely the worst case model displaying more
12Hansen and Sargent (2000a, 2000b) analyze this point at length through spectral analysis, showing
how the evil agent often accentuates the low frequency components of the exogenous processes.
13Kasa (2001) proves that a robust forecaster, whose loss function is the mean squared error, revises the
forecast by more than a standard forecaster following new information, because she is more vulnerable
when she underestimates the persistence of the driving processes.
17persistence than the approximating model, suggests than we can often expect robustness
to make forward looking prices overreact to news. This implies that robustness makes
asset prices more volatile and more forecastable, as illustrated in the applications of
sections 4.1 and 3.1.
Application: The Term Structure of Interest Rates
The literature considered in this paper is young, and yet oﬀers several interesting empiri-
cal applications, including consumption/saving decisions (Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini
(1999)), asset pricing (Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2000), Hansen, Sargent, and Tal-
larini (1999), Tornell (2000)), and monetary policy rules (Hansen and Sargent (2001),
Giannoni (2002), Onatski (2000)). In the latter case the focus is on the behavior of the
short interest rate (the policy instrument). We suggest a natural extension, namely to
consider the implied behavior of multiperiod interest rates. We continue to work with
the model of Section 2.2.14 The exercise could be carried out assuming commitment, but
discretion is arguably more realistic, so we opt for the latter.
Let it—the policy instrument—be the one period interest rate (not annualized). We
assume that multiperiod rates obey the expectations hypothesis of the term structure.







where E∗ denotes robust expectations, that is, expectations which condition on the worst
case model. We also deﬁne a ‘fundamental’ rate, computed substituting the mathematical
expectation E for the robust expectation E∗ in equation (23). The fundamental rate
therefore guarantees that no expected excess proﬁts are available, whereas the actual rate
does not. Referring to Figure 3, the actual rate and the fundamental rate are derived by
plugging into equation (23) the path of the short interest rate for the worst case model
and for the approximating model respectively.
Figure 4 shows the diﬀerence—at the time of a unit shock to the inﬂation equation—
between a long (h = 4) interest rate, and the correponding fundamental rate, for diﬀerent
degrees of robustness (represented by error detection probabilities). This diﬀerence can
be considered an overreaction in the classical sense that the price of the multiperiod bond
14Parameter values are the same as in Section 2.2, and θ again implies a detection error probability of
20% in a sample of 150 observations.
18Figure 4: Over-reaction of the long interest rate to a CP shock as a function of the degree
of robustness (in terms of the detection error probability) in the model of Clarida et al.
(1999) with discretionary solution. 0.01 corresponds to one basis point.
reacts to a shock by jumping beyond its new equilibrium value (we are assuming, of course,
that the approximating model is in fact the DGP). The overreaction is around 1.25% at
a 20% detection probability, and grows monotonously with the degree of robustness.
A rather large empirical literature on the term structure has found that actual changes
in short interest rates are smaller than predicted by the slope of the yield curve.15 Our
examples show that robust expectations can contribute to an interpretation of this ﬁnding.
Application: The Inﬂation Bias
A well known example of how the presence or absence of a commitment technology can
aﬀect an economic outcome is the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy ﬁrst
studied by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). They assume
that the planner is targeting a level of output above potential output, and then show that
the discretionary solution involves an inﬂation bias (inﬂation is higher than the optimal
level). The model of Kydland and Prescott is static and involves expectations about the
control variable, so it cannot be cast into the form of equation (11). However, an analyt-
ical solution is available. Hansen and Sargent (2002) show that fear of misspeciﬁcation
15See, for example, Walsh (1998) ch. 10 and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) ch. 10.
19increases the inﬂation bias. The intuition is that the planner fears that the expected value
of output is lower than in the approximating model, which increases the distance between
desired and expected output. Thus a preference for robustness has the same eﬀect as an
increase in target output: higher inﬂation.
With our solution approach for discretion in dynamic models, we can recast Hansen
and Sargent’s exercise in more general settings. Here we study the inﬂation bias in the
dynamic model of Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999) used in the previous section (equations












Technically, this requires adding the constant 1 to the vector of predetermined vari-
ables. Average inﬂation in the standard RE solution is then a positive function of y∗. In
our proposed solution for the discretionary case, the evil agent’s control vector, vt+1, is a
linear function of the predetermined variables, just like the central bank’s policy rule.
It turns out that the evil agent decides to aﬀect both the constant and the autoregres-
sive parameters, thus increasing both the mean of inﬂation and its variance. The constant
is negative because y∗ is positive. Intuitively, since the loss function is symmetric in y
around y∗ while the evil agent’s cost is symmetric in y around zero, it is cheap and eﬀec-
tive for the evil agent to set a negative constant to output. The result is that robustness
leads to an increase of average inﬂation in the discretionary solution, for the same reason
as in the Kydland-Prescott example.
Figure 5 shows how the inﬂation bias varies with the degree of robustness in the model
of Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999). The calibration is the same as in Section 2.2. We
set y∗ to 0.4. The inﬂation rate is deﬁned as the growth rate in prices during one period.
Therefore, if we think of the model as applying to quarterly data, an inﬂation bias of 0.8%
translates into an annual bias of approximately 3.2%.
4 Robust Control with Simple Rules
The monetary policy literature has paid a good deal of attention to the properties of simple
rules, deﬁned as commitment rules that set the policy instrument as a linear function of
the system variables. Examples include Taylor type rules and rules for money growth.
Simple rules are typically not optimal. In some cases they are motivated as good empirical
approximations to actual policy.
20Figure 5: Inﬂation bias as a function of the detection error probability in the model of
Clarida et al. (1999). The horizontal line gives the inﬂation bias for the RE solution.
In other cases simple rules are justiﬁed as an attempt to identify rules that work well
in a variety of models. A prominent proponent of robustness in this sense is McCallum
(1988, 1999). An interesting example is Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2001), who focus
on simple monetary policy rules that work well in models that incorporate rather diﬀerent
views of the transmission mechanism.16
This literature uses the term robust for a rule that performs well across models. Hansen
and Sargent propose, instead, to design rules that perform well for deviations around a
single model. Sims (2001) argues that a Hansen-Sargent robust solution to a single ap-
proximating model may in fact not be robust in the sense of McCallum. There is of course
no reason why the two concepts should be substitutes rather than complements: one could
try to identify a rule that is robust in a Hansen-Sargent’s sense for several approximating
models, or, when possible, merge the competing models and thus reduce model uncer-
tainty to parameter uncertainty. A preliminary requirement for this is to specify solution
concepts for simple rules in a Hansen-Sargent robust framework. A solution for backward
looking models is already available, and one for forward looking models is proposed in
this section.
Another reasons why we are interested in simple rules in a robust framework is that
16Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001) evaluate the performance of simple monetary policy rules (compared
to optimal rules) in several variations of a baseline model.
21they allow us to isolate the eﬀects of the private sector deviations from RE. In eﬀect, a
planner who has committed to a given simple rule is no longer involved in any decision,
so any change in economic outcome between the RE and the robust solution is entirely
due to the role of private sector expectations.
4.1 Simple Rules in Backward Looking Models
Managing a simple rule in a backward looking model is a straightforward application of
the robust pure prediction problem analyzed in Hansen and Sargent (2002) and Kasa
(2001). The planner commits to a speciﬁc Fu in setting ut = −Fuxt (where xt can be
augmented by any variables that are important for policy decisions). Then the evil agent














subject to xt+1 = (A − BFu)xt + C(vt+1 + t+1),
and where x0 is given. This is a standard RE problem of ﬁnding the optimal policy rule
in a backward looking model. The evil agent will therefore choose to set vt+1 as a linear
function of the state xt.
Example: A Simple Forecasting Problem As an illustration, consider a simple
robust forecasting problem. Let the loss function be the mean squared forecast error
Et(xt+i − xe
t+i,t)2, where xe
t+i,t denotes the forecast of xt+i made at time t. Suppose that
xt is the amount of dividends. The approximating model of the dividend is an AR(1)
process (A in (25) is the autoregressive coeﬃcient and B = 0).
It is straightforward to show that the robust forecast of xt+i at time t, denoted by
E
∗
t xt+i, is E
∗
t xt+i = (A∗)ixt, where A∗ > A so the investor forecasts as if the process
driving dividends was more persistent than in the approximating model. The investor
thus fears that the process has high peristence. The intuition is that more persistence
gives larger uncertainty of long horizon forecasts (as future shocks are propagated more).
If the asset price is the discounted (at rate β) sum of expected dividends, then we get
the price xt/(1 − A∗β). Since A∗ is a positive function of the degree of robustness, so too
is the price variance.17 A small degree of robustness can have large eﬀects on the behavior
of prices. For example, let β = 0.98, and A = 0.99, and A∗ = 1. This relatively small
17See Hansen and Sargent (2002), from which this example is adapted.
22degree of robustness implies an increase of around 50% in the standard deviation of the
asset price.
4.2 Simple Rules in Forward Looking Models
The forward looking case is less straightforward. We propose to be more speciﬁc about the
set of models from which the evil agent can choose (that is, the type of misspeciﬁcation
feared), by imposing that he sets his instruments vt+1 as a linear function of predetermined
variables. That is, we allow for misspeciﬁcations of the form
vt+1 = −Fvx1t, (26)
and leave the evil agent free to choose the coeﬃcients of the (n1 × n1) matrix Fv (within
the limits of the budget deﬁned by θ).
For the moment we concentrate on the technical aspects of our proposed solution,
postponing its motivation to the end of this section. Formally, we suggest to set up the
problem as (recall that all shocks are included in the predetermined variables, so the lower
































and where x10 is given. The constraint vt+1 = Fvx1t has been imposed and the maximiza-
tion is explicitly in terms of Fv. The interpretation is that the planner is fearing errors in
the coeﬃcients which relate predetermined variables to lags of predetermined variables.
For a given Fu, the solution concept is that of a simple rule in a forward looking model:
private sector expectations are consistent with the evolution of the economy in the worse
case model (which requires that the Fv which solves the problem is correctly perceived by
the private sector). The solution algorithm for a given Fv is outlined in Appendix D. The
solution to (27) is then found by letting a numerical maximization routine search over
Fv. (It is also possible to ﬁnd an optimal robust simple rule by then letting a numerical
minimization routine search over Fu.)
The formal representation of the equilibrium can be written in the same form as in
the discretionary case (21)–(22) where the predetermined variables (x1t) follow a VAR(1)
process and the other variables are linear functions of the predetermined variables (see
Appendix B for details).
23Example: The Simple New Keynesian Model The state space form is as for
the commitment and discretionary solution, except that the researcher must provide a
matrix Fu (and of course a value of θ).
Motivation of Our Robust Simple Solution
We will now motivate of our proposed solution for the simple rule in a forward looking
model. Recall that we are constraining the vt+1 to be a linear function of predetermined
variables. Why this constraint? The problem is that an evil agent free to commit to any
rule uses agents’ expectations to his advantage, and therefore makes the set of plausible
models dependent on the expectation formation. By strategically exploiting expectations,
an agent free to commit can drive the loss function to inﬁnity for any degree of robustness,
for example by committing to an exponentially increasing or decreasing series of vt+1, a
highly improbable misspeciﬁcation to fear. This does not happen when the planner is
allowed to choose a robust policy (in the commitment or discretionary case)—but it
happens with a simple rule since the policy maker is bound to follow a given rule. To put
it simply, the planner is defenceless against the evil agent.
On the other hand, the choice of constraining vt+1 to be linear in the predetermined
variables ensures that the set of misspeciﬁcations that the planner considers plausible is
given exogenously, in the sense that it does not depend on how expectations are formed,
and that there is a ﬁnite θ for which a model that has stable dynamics under RE remains
stable in the robust solution.
The following example illustrates the argument. Let the planner’s loss function depend
on squared inﬂation rates, L0 = E0 Σ∞
t=0βtπ2
t, and the law of motion of the economy be
given by the simpliﬁed Calvo style Phillips curve
πt = β Et πt+1 + t, where t is iid with Et = 0 and Var(t) = 1.
In this case, the planner has no eﬀect at all on inﬂation—but the more general point is
that he cannot revise his policy to defend against the evil agent. Assume that the evil














18We write the evil agent’s constraint explicitly rather than in terms of the Lagrange multiplier θ. A
high η0 corresponds to a low θ. We also set c = std(t) = 1.
24It is straightforward to prove that an evil agent who is able to commit will choose
a non-stationary (exponentially increasing or decreasing) vt+1 (see Appendix C), which
makes the loss function unbounded for any strictly positive η0. The misspeciﬁcation feared
is then a trend increase (or decrease) of inﬂation, which is a case of limited interest.
In contrast, this problem has a well deﬁned solution under our proposed approach
to the simple rule case, which here forces the evil agent to set vt+1 as a function of t
(the only predetermined variable), say vt+1 = at. The robust expectations are therefore
formed as if the standard deviation of the errors was 1 + a rather than 1.
Application: Output and Inﬂation Volatility
The diﬀerences between the robust and RE solutions illustrated in Figure 3 are due to
deviations from rational expectations of both the planner and the private sector. The
solution approach to simple rules in forward looking models developed in Section 4.2
opens up the possibility of isolating the eﬀects of private sector deviations from RE. We
might then ask how a preference for robustness on the part of the private sector aﬀects
macroeconomic variables and asset prices, keeping the behavior of the planner ﬁxed by
assuming that she has committed to a simple rule.
To illustrate, we continue to consider the simple model of Section 2.2. The goal is
to establish a link between the degree of robustness and the volatility of inﬂation and
output.
The central bank is assumed to commit to the Taylor rule
it = 1.5πt + 0.5yt.










As in the other equilibria, N is a function of θ and does not depend on whether the
planner’s fears are founded or not (that is, the approximating model and the worst case
model share the same way of forming expectations).
We assume that the approximating model is correct, and therefore that x1t evolves as
(see Appendix B)
x1t+1 = Max1t + C11t, (30)
from which we obtain the variance of the predetermined shocks (e1t and e2t). The matrix
N in (29) is then used to compute the variance of the corresponding series of output and
25inﬂation. This is done for the standard RE case (θ = ∞) and for the robust case.
The variance of output and inﬂation is found to be a monotonous function of the
degree of robustness (an inverse function of θ). At θ = 850, which corresponds to a 20%
error detection probability for a sample of 150 observations, the variances of output and
inﬂation are some 3% and 46% higher than in the standard RE case respectively.
To gain some intuition for this result, it is useful to compare the matrix Ma, which
actually generates the predetermined variables in (30), and M, which corresponds to the
worst case model and therefore to agents’ expectations (see Appendix B). The parameters














Comparing Ma and M, we notice that the planner is fearing that the exogenous processes
are more persistent than in the approximating model. Expecting persistent dynamics of
the driving processes (the predetermined variables), consumers and price setters overreact
to news, in the sense that output and inﬂation have a stronger response to shocks than
in the RE case.
Using the same model we can isolate the eﬀects of robust expectations on the term
structure. The results (not reported) are similar to those of the discretionary solution,
shown in Figure 3 and 4: the public fears more persistent eﬀects of shocks and multiperiod
interest rates overreact.19
Application: Publishing Central Bank Forecasts
Sims (2001) argues that a min-max approach to robustness is better suited to capture
agents’ near rational behavior than as a normative course of action for central banks. The
following example embraces his point of view and departs from the assumption that the
private sector and the central bank share the same information and the same taste for
robustness. We assume that the central bank has a good and precisely estimated model,
while the private sector nurtures strong doubts about the behavior of the economy.
To simplify the problem as much as possible, we make the following assumptions.
19We obtained similar results on the behavior of long interest rates in the model of Fuhrer (1997), with
the parameters estimated in S¨ oderlind (1999).
26First, the private sector does not know the model (or simply the coeﬃcients) estimated
by the central bank, but it knows that the bank has an accurate representation of the
economy. Second, the central bank follows the Taylor rule it = 1.5πt + 0.5yt. Third, the
private sector’s approximating model is the same as the central bank’s and it is also the
DGP.
The second assumption means that we can adopt the simple rule solution developed
in Section 4.2. Altogether, these three assumptions are admittedly unrealistic, but they
help us make the following point: the central bank can reduce the variance of inﬂation and
output by releasing information to the public, for example in the form of forecasts. To
verify the statement, notice that if the central bank does not release information, the setup
and outcome is exactly as in the previous application, where robustness increases business
cycle volatility. However, if the central bank announces its forecasts of the predetermined
variables, the private sector makes these forecasts their own (by the ﬁrst assumption),
taking the economy back to the superior RE solution.
Whether central banks should release explicit forecasts is a matter of current debate
(see Svensson (2001) for a list of central banks that do, and arguments in favor of the
practice). While our example cannot be a serious attack on the issue, it does lead us to
believe that a more thorough investigation would be worth the eﬀort.
5 Conclusions
The approach to dealing with model uncertainty proposed by Lars Hansen and Thomas
Sargent seems promising from both a normative (designing a rule that works well in a
neighborhood of the approximating model) and a descriptive (replicating the behavior of
actual agents) perspective. In the discussion of ﬁscal and monetary policy, much of the
debate is centered around two non history dependent sets of policies: simple rules and
discretionary solutions, which Hansen and Sargent do not consider. This paper proposes
solution approaches for simple rules and discretion. These extensions preserve the prop-
erty that the robust program can be written and solved as a suitably modiﬁed rational
expectations program. Some applications show that these extensions can be interesting
for applied work. The analysis of the term structure of interest rates complements previ-
ous research and suggests that standard models give a better empirical description of asset
returns if agents are attributed a taste for robustness. The result that the inﬂation bias
increases with robustness can be interpreted as saying that the gains from commitment
27increase if potential output is imprecisely estimated. The application to the variance of
inﬂation and output for a given policy function is perhaps the most interesting. It suggests
that a robust private sector may amplify those same ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output
that it fears, and can provide a theoretical motivation for central banks to be transparent
about their forecasts.
Appendix A Software
Our software can be downloaded freely at http://home.tiscalinet.ch/paulsoderlind. A
user’s manual and example programs are provided. The procedures follow the notation of
this paper, and their syntax is therefore immediately understood. The user needs to write
the loss function (that is, specify β,Q,R,U), write the model in state space form (that is,
specify A,B,C,n1), select a θ, and decide on a solution algorithm (commitment, discre-
tion, simple rule). Advanced users can ﬁne tune the optimization algorithms. Bayesian
error detection probability is also implemented (assuming normally distributed errors) to
assist the user in selecting θ. We follow Hansen and Sargent in plotting the probability
(of selecting the wrong model) against σ = −1/θ, rather than against θ. To ﬁnd the θ
corresponding to a probability of 0.2 in the Euler+Calvo model (discretionary solution),
we solved the model 10,000 times. This took around 20 seconds on a Pentium III PC
using Gauss, and a few seconds more using Matlab.
Appendix B Reduced Form Dynamics
This appendix shows how to compute the dynamics of the worst case and of the approxi-
mating model in the commitment case. The discretionary and simple rule case are special
instances (ρ1t = ρ2t = 0).









































with ρ20 = 0n2×1. In the discretionary and simple rule solutions, ρ2t = 0 for all t.
28Equations (31) and (32) give the dynamics of the worst case model. To retrieve the

































































where Ma = P −1(A − BFu)P. The values x1t and x2t are then determined by (35) and
(32). In applications, Ma is sometimes not a function of θ. This happens when the
predetermined variables are block exogenous, that is, independent of lagged values of the
forward looking variables.
Appendix C The Stability Problem of Robust Sim-
ple Rules
Proposition 1 If η0 is strictly positive, the loss function is unbounded. This outcome can
be achieved by the evil agent committing to an ever increasing (or decreasing) constant in
the law of motion.








The constraint is binding, so η0 = α2(1 − βγ2) and the problem can be written as
maxγ
α2
(1 − βγ2)(1 − βγ)2, s.t. 1 − βγ
2 > 0. (37)
29This problem does not have a maximum: γ =
p
1/β is a supremum. However, the
evil agent can pick a γ∗ such that 1 < γ∗ <
p
1/β, which in turn makes the loss
unbounded by (37), and limt→∞ E0πt = ∞ by (36).
Appendix D Solution Algorithm for the Simple Pol-
icy Rule
Appendix D.1 Simple Rule: The Solution for a given Fv
We start by ﬁnding the equilibrium for a given “decision rule” of the evil agent, Fv. Take
















Calculate the Schur decomposition of D.20 The decomposition of the n × n matrix D
gives the matrices T and Z such that
D = ZTZ
H (39)
where Z is a unitary n×n matrix (so ZZH = I, where ZH is the transpose of the complex
conjugate of Z) and T is an n × n upper triangular Schur form with the eigenvalues
along the diagonal. The ordering of the eigenvalues in T is here reshuﬄed so the stable
eigenvalues (with a modulus less than unity) come ﬁrst, although this requires that Z is
reshuﬄed conformably to keep (39) to hold.












where θt corresponds to the stable eigenvalues in T. Use the Schur decomposition (39) in
20This decomposition is used to solve the eigenvalue problem Dx = λx. The results in the text hold
also for the real Schur decomposition, where Z is a real orthogonal matrix, and T a real upper quasi-
triangular matrix. If A − BF has linearly independent eigenvectors, then a spectral decomposition can
be used. See Golub and van Loan (1989).


































where T is partitioned conformably with (40). Notice that the last equation gives a
recursive dynamics of δt and θt.
Since Tδδ contains the roots outside the unit circle, δt will diverge as t increases unless
δ0 = 0. Any stable solution will therefore require that δt = 0 for all t, so (41) can be
written as δt = 0 and Et θt+1 = Tθθθt.



















since δt = 0.
We have initial values of the backward looking variables, that is, values on x10. From
(42) x10 = Zkθθ0, which can be solved for θ0 if Zkθ is invertible. This matrix has n1 rows
(as many as elements in x1t) and nθ columns (as many as stable roots), so a necessary
condition is that the number of stable roots equal the number of backward looking vari-
ables (the saddlepoint condition in proposition 1of Blanchard and Kahn (1980)).If that is
the case, then θ0 = Z
−1
kθ x10.21
To put the innovations back we take the following steps. From (27) x1t+1 −Et x1t+1 =
C1t+1. Use (42) to rewrite as Zkθ (θt+1 − Et θt+1) = C1t+1. If Zkθ is invertible (see above),
then θt+1 = Et θt+1 + Z
−1
kθ C1t+1. Combined with the previous result that Et θt+1 = Tθθθt,
we have θt+1 = Tθθθt + Z
−1
kθ C1t+1. The last step is to combine this expression with (42)
to write the dynamics in terms of x1t and x2t
x1t+1 = Mx1t + C1t+1, where M = ZkθTθθZ
−1
kθ (43)
x2t = Nx1t, where N = ZλθZ
−1
kθ . (44)
21If the number of stable roots is less than the number of predetermined variables, n1, then there is no
stable solution. If the number of stable roots is larger than the number of predetermined variables, n1,
then there is an inﬁnite number of stable solutions.
31Appendix D.2 Simple Rule: The Optimal Choice of Fv






























The evil agent maximizes the loss function (45) by choosing the optimal elements in
the decision rule Fv. This rule is found by a non-linear optimization algorithm.
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